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Abstract: 
The worldwide populist wave has contributed to a perception that international law is currently in a 
state of crisis. This article examines in how far populist governments have challenged prevailing 
interpretations of international law. The article links structural features of populism with an 
analysis of populist governmental strategies and argumentative practices. It demonstrates that, in 
their rhetoric, populist governments promote an understanding of international law as a mere law 
of coordination. This is, however, not entirely reflected in their legal practices where an 
instrumental, cherry-picking approach prevails. The article concludes that policies of populist 
governments affect the current state of international law on two different levels: In the political 
sphere their practices alter the general environment in which legal rules are interpreted. In the legal 
sphere populist governments push for changes in the interpretation of established international 
legal rules. The article substantiates these propositions by focusing on the principle of non-
intervention and foreign funding for NGOs.  
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‘The eggheads who came up with this international law should turn on their TV’.2 The quote from US 
President Trump epitomizes populist resentments against the international legal order: 
international legal rules are seen as a creation of an intellectual technocratic elite which is out of 
touch with the real world. The quote mirrors a sentiment that these rules disregard the interests of 
the ‘people’. By using a tone of defiance it aims to delegitimize constraints that international law 
places on political decision-makers.  
The election of US President Trump has raised the concern that populist governments may not only 
represent a challenge for liberal constitutionalism at the national level3 but also contribute to a 
broader crisis of international law.4 The UN Secretary-General,5 the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights6 and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe7 have identified populism as a 
serious challenge for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. While the specific role of the US 
in the global order brought the populist challenge for international law into the spotlight, 
comparable governmental practices and argumentative strategies can be found in numerous other 
countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Turkey or Venezuela.8 
Populist movements exert considerable influence in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK9 
as well as in Israel.10 All veto powers in the Security Council except for China are to some extend 
affected by what may be considered as populist policies.  
Some scholars doubt that focussing on populism contributes anything to an analysis of the current 
challenges for international law. They submit that the singular role of the US blurs the picture. 
After all, the US has a long history of not joining or leaving multilateral agreements and 
organizations. Therefore, the Trump administration’s approach could rather represent a 
continuation of US foreign policy than a radical change.11 Comparing US policies with those in 
Hungary or Venezuela may also raise doubts as to whether the phenomenon of populism can be 
sufficiently delineated in order to serve as an analytical category. To focus on populism as a 
challenge for international law may therefore just distract from the structural shortcomings of 
international law. After all, the populist critique that globalization lacks legitimacy is shared by 
                                                        
2 Smith, Donald Trump dismisses 'eggheads' who developed international laws banning torture, 22 March 2016, 
available at http://www.businessinsider.de/donald-trump-brussels-attacks-waterboarding-2016-3?r=US&IR=T 
(all internet sources have last been visited on 26 October 2018). 
3 Müller, ‘Populism and Constitutionalism’ in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism 
(2017).  
4 Alston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Human Rights’, 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice (2017), 1; Posner, ‘Liberal 
Internationalism and the Populist Backlash’, 49 Arizona State Law Journal (2017), 795. 
5 UN Secretary-General's remarks to the Human Rights Council, 27 February 2017. 
6 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Speech delivered on 5 September 2016. 
7 Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Speech delivered on 24 January 2017. 
8 Huq and Ginsburg, ‘How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy’, 65 UCLA Law Review (2018) 78, at 82.  
9 Taggart, ‘Populism in Western Europe’ in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al (eds), supra note 3, 248, at 256. 
10 Hostovsky Brandes, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts in an Era of Populism’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, forthcoming. 
11 Alter, ‘The Future of International Law’, in D. Ayton-Shenker (ed.), The New Global Agenda, (2018), 25, at 30; 
Bosco, ‘We have been here before’, 70 Journal of International Affairs (2017), 9, at 11. 
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many academic observers.12 Anyway, for a traditional legal analysis the challenge populism may 
represent is difficult to grasp. Lawyers are, in principle, not methodologically equipped for an 
empirically based analysis of the interrelatedness between globalization critique, the rise of 
populist policies and structural changes in international law. Based on their methodological toolkit 
lawyers can first and foremost only identify whether a legal rule comes into existence, changes its 
interpretation or ceases to exist. 13  For the purpose of identifying structural changes in the 
international legal system it is neither necessary nor sufficient to evaluate whether a specific actor 
has contributed to these changes. Above all, an analytical focus on a particular actor cannot 
substantiate a claim that the law has indeed changed. 
However, if lawyers want to assess whether a perceived crisis represents a more permanent turn in 
the development of international law they also need to take into account changes in the 
environment in which rules operate. Here actor-centred approaches are conducive because they 
start from the assumption that discursive practices as well as political concepts influence legally 
relevant practice and thus the overall development of international law.14 Thereby, actor-centred 
approaches can bridge the gap between political phenomena and their legal impact. Observations 
about significant actors which pursue policies and submit legal interpretations deviating from a 
formerly prevailing understanding, can explain changes and form a basis for an evaluation of the 
seriousness of the symptoms of a crisis. If there is a prima facie sense that political concepts 
challenge certain elements of international law a categorization of actors based on a definitional 
template can help to identify the pertinent impacts. What is decisive is to delineate a concept that 
offers some analytical guidance in identifying common characteristics between the policies of 
governments in countries such as Hungary, the United States, or Venezuela.15 Unlike in the case of 
National Socialist or Soviet doctrines of international law there exists no specific populist doctrine 
of international law which would forge a coherent systematic concept developed in scholarly 
writing. Therefore, any study of a populist approach to international law can only rely on a 
combination of structural arguments of what populism consists of and an empirical analysis of 
pertinent governmental practices and argumentative strategies. 
The article argues, on the basis of such an actor-centred approach, that populist governments 
advance an understanding of international law as a law of coordination. However, their practices 
are not coherent, and the most robust challenges are confined to the level of rhetoric while in their 
legal practices an instrumental cherry-picking approach prevails (3.B). Their policies affect the 
current state of international law on two different levels: In the political sphere their practices 
alter the overall environment in which legal rules are interpreted (3.C.). In the legal sphere populist 
governments push for changes in the interpretation of established international legal rules. Since 
the current rise of populist governments is intrinsically linked to the world-wide spread of 
democracy and globalization in the 1990s their impact on international law is in particularly 
discernable where democracy and international law are interlinked. Populist governments, in 
particular, tend to reject emanations of global public opinion based on NGO participation because 
                                                        
12 E.g. Bogdandy, ‘Globalization and Europe’, 15 The European Journal of International Law (2004), 885; Weiler, 
‘The Geology of International Law’, 64 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2004), 
547, at 561. 
13 Krieger and Nolte, ‘The International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline? Points of Departure’, KFG Working Paper 
Series, No. 1 (October 2016), at 15; available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2866940. 
14 L. Mälksöo, Russian Approaches to International Law (2015), at 2. 
15 Cf. Huq, ‘The People against the Constitution’, 116 Michigan Law Review (2018), 1123, at 1132. 
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civil society weakens their claim to exclusively represent the people. Thus, the recent legislation 
regulating foreign-funding for NGOs can partly be traced back to populist governmental strategies. 
These efforts raise the question as to how international legal institutions can respond (3.D.).  
2. What Constitutes a Populist Government? 
Any analysis of the populist impact on international law is confronted with the problem that 
populism is a widely used, yet imprecise and highly disputed term. It often serves as a vague 
placeholder for various political phenomena which are considered to be anti-establishment. 16 
Daily political parlance proves the highly inconsistent use of the term populism. While populism in 
Europe was predominantly seen as a right-wing phenomenon, in the wake of the financial crisis 
some forms of left-wing populism gained ground, in particular in Greece and Spain.17  In Latin 
America populist movements are usually seen as left-wing movements with a socio-economic 
emphasis.18 The diversity of the phenomenon increases if one applies the term to certain political 
movements in Russia and the US in the 19th century.19 Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish 
populism from authoritarianism and nationalism. Thus, it is disputed whether the current Indian 
government should be qualified as a nationalist or populist government20 while Russia can be seen 
as an authoritarian as well as a populist regime.21 Likewise, very different understandings of 
populism persist in academic literature. The divergence in the definitions reflects the difficulty to 
discern to what extent populism is an inherent element of a communitarian understanding of 
democracy 22  whose emancipatory power allows to mobilize those excluded in society 23  or 
something that somehow deviates from democracy. 
In order to use a sufficiently delineated analytical category the article applies a formal 
interpretation of populism based on the work of the political scientist Jan-Werner Müller. A formal 
approach allows to carve out to what extent the defining characteristics of populism pose a 
specific structural challenge for international law. The alternative approach offered by Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser defines populism as a thin-centred ideology which hinges on elements of other 
ideologies.24 However, focussing on underlying ideologies, such as right-wing nationalism, entails 
the risk to analyse the impact of these ideologies on foreign policy choices25 instead of discerning 
the unique characteristics of populism which may lead to ruptures in the international legal order.  
In a formal understanding populism is characterized by three defining features: an antagonistic 
anti-establishment attitude, an anti-pluralist stance and holistic exclusionary identity politics.26 
                                                        
16 C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A very short introduction (2017), at 9. 
17 Katsambekis, ‘The Populist Surge in Post-Democratic Times’, 88 The Political Quarterly (2017), 202, at 203. 
18 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 31. 
19 Cf. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 22 et seqq. 
20 Jaffrelot and Tillin, ‘Populism in India’ in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al (eds), supra note 3, 179. 
21 Suggesting a populist character: J-W. Müller, What is Populism (2016), at 48; denying a populist character: 
March, ‘Populism in the Post-Soviet States’ in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al (eds), supra note 3, 214, at 221; arguing, 
however, that Putin uses a populist rhetoric. 
22 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser supra note 16, at 3 and 10. 
23 E. Laclau, On Populist Reason (2005); E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2nd ed. 2001). 
24 Mudde, ‘Populism: An Ideational Approach’ in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al (eds), supra note 3, 27, at 30. 
25 Verbeek and Zaslove, ‘Populism and Foreign Policy’ in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al (eds), supra note 3, 384, at 
395. 
26 Müller, supra note 21, at 3. 
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These stances translate into certain argumentative strategies and governmental practices. In the 
literature, there is apparently general agreement about the antagonistic character of populism and 
its anti-establishment attitude which opposes ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’.27 Thus, 
populism relies on a distinction which divides society into a ‘morally pure and fully unified … but 
ultimately fictional people’ and the establishment often conceived as the capitalist elite or the 
liberal elite.28 In addition, populism possesses a decisively anti-pluralist stance. ‘Populists hold 
that those who don’t support them … may not themselves properly belong to the people.’29 Thus, 
they disqualify any opposition as illegitimate. From a procedural perspective populists pursue a 
holistic approach: Populist politicians assert that they can recognize the true will of ‘the people’ 
exclusively on their own.30 Accordingly, populist politicians use the term ‘the people’ as a mystified 
social construct for justifying their ideas of change with ‘the people’ operating as a placeholder31 
for interchangeable political ideas and social causes.32 What is decisive is the identity element in 
defining who ‘the people’ are and what ‘the people’ want. From a populist perspective there is only 
one singular common good which can be transferred into ‘a singularly correct policy that can be 
collectively willed.’33 Thus, populism is not an ideology, not even a thin one, but a mindset or 
framework associated with certain governmental practices and argumentative strategies. 
In states where populist parties rule alone, their strategies to govern often result in a process of 
constitutional retrogression implying a gradual transition from democracy to authoritarian 
regimes.34 Populist governments often aim to ‘hijack’ national institutions35 and to restrict the 
controlling functions of parliament36 and courts.37 They recurrently try to limit the freedom of the 
press and certain minority rights.38 Populist politicians oppose civil society and tend to reject 
participatory processes of decision-making. This attitude renders political compromise and 
consensus difficult to reach.39  
For the purpose of this article populist governments are considered to be those governments in 
which parties that pursue populist politics rule alone, or in a coalition, or which are supported by 
populist parties in national parliaments so that populist politics directly impact on governmental 
activities. In academic literature and research reports the governments of Austria, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Switzerland, and Slovakia are 
currently (October 2018) seen as populist within the EU.40 Moreover, the governments of Bolivia, 
Ecuador (under President Correa), India, Israel, the Philippines, Russia, Turkey, the United States 
                                                        
27 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 6. 
28 Müller, supra note 21, at 19 et seq. 
29 Müller, ‘Capitalism in One Family’, 38 London Review of Books (2016), 10. 
30 Müller, supra note 21, at 20 and 29. 
31 Laclau, supra note 23, at 96: ‘empty signifier’. 
32 Katsambekis, supra note 17, at 204. 
33 Müller, supra note 21, at 26. 
34 Huq and Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 118; Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’, 85 The University of Chicago Law 
Review (2018), 545 et seq. 
35 Müller, supra note 21, at 4. 
36 Council of Europe, Secretary General 2017 Report: Populism - How strong are Europe’s checks and balances? 
(2017), at 6. 
37 Müller, supra note 21, at 45. 
38 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 82 et seq. 
39 Müller, supra note 21, at 20; cf. Council of Europe, supra note 36, at 6. 
40 Cf. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Rise of Populist Sovereignism (2017), at 97. 
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and Venezuela have been categorized as populist or as applying populist governmental practices 
and argumentative strategies. 
Populist governments present a particularly complex challenge since governmental practices often 
work ‘under cover of law.’41 Their manoeuvring in grey areas suggests that these governments are 
mostly aware that a turn to open authoritarianism would be too costly in terms of political 
reputation at the international level.42 Therefore, they do not flagrantly violate legal obligations but 
tend to use constitutional amendments, declarations of emergencies, or the enactment of new 
constitutions to change the existing constitutional frame. 43  As a result, populist strategies 
challenge the lawyer’s ability to distinguish bona fide from mala fide arguments. Within every 
constitutional system governments may violate legal obligations, enact constitutional amendments 
whose legitimate goals are contested, dishonour international obligations, or withdraw from 
international agreements. Thus, the tipping point where such practices seriously impair human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law is difficult to determine.44 This problem is aggravated where 
populism gives voice to criticism of prevailing political or legal structures which could otherwise be 
overheard. After all, the unresponsiveness of ‘elites’ is often seen as a reason for the rise of 
populist movements within a state.45 Globalization critique directed against democratic deficits of 
global governance is a case in point. 
3. Contesting the 1990s Narrative of International Law 
As the ‘Eggheads’ remark by President Trump exemplifies, the anti-elitist stance of populism often 
aims to oppose ‘the people’ with ‘the global technocratic elite’ so that populist governmental 
practices and argumentative patterns extend to the international level. They challenge certain 
elements and predominant interpretations of international law as they have developed after the 
end of the Cold War. 
a) From ‘Open’ to ‘Closed’ Statehood? 
Since the 1990s many international lawyers have shared a certain expectation that legal concepts, 
such as the rule of law, the right to democratic governance or universal human rights standards 
would constantly evolve more or less in one direction. International law seemed to have turned 
into a system which promotes community interests based on a shared understanding of solidarity. 
Multilateral treaties and highly institutionalized organizations offered a legal frame for global 
governance. It was seen to have moved beyond a law of coordination to a law which includes firmly 
established structural elements of cooperation.46 Correspondingly, state sovereignty and its legal 
emanations, such as the principle of non-intervention, were seen to be losing relevance. The 
metaphor of the “end of history” signalled the end of the normative contestations within the 
international community which had characterized the era of the Cold War and the democratic 
constitutional model was spread as the dominant model of governance in constitution-making 
                                                        
41 Scheppele, supra note 34, at 549. 
42 Müller, supra note 21, at 50. 
43 Huq and Ginsberg, supra note 8, at 123; Scheppele, supra note 34, at 549 et seq.  
44 Cf. Huq and Ginsberg, supra note 8, at 118. 
45 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 109. 
46 Wolfrum, ‘International Law’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(2006), para. 49. 
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processes.47 Simultaneously, there was a perception that democratic constitutionalism is open to 
international law and establishes legal structures that allow for compliance with international 
law.48 The concept is embraced by the German constitutional law term offene Staatlichkeit (‘open 
statehood’).49 Incentives for promoting such a model were seen to lie in the stabilizing factor 
international law exerts on states. It seemed to be a safety net for liberal democratic elites in 
newly established democracies. Against such a background a bond to international law was 
considered as an ‘expression to a national identity, part of which is the commitment to a global 
community structured around universal values’.50 
However, this optimistic perception changed gradually. The impacts of globalization on local 
societies, such as climate change or the crises of global finance markets, have promoted the 
impression that the promises attributed to international law in the period after 1990 have not been 
fulfilled. Output legitimacy of international institutions based on expert knowledge as the 
traditional source of legitimacy seems increasingly flawed. Global governance is no longer seen as 
a redress against a negatively connoted concept of sovereignty but as a threat to a localized 
exercise of public power.51 The search for other sources of legitimacy for global governance pushed 
for two opposite yet intertwined discourses, both aiming at redefining the relationship between 
the global and local level: on the one hand, some voices promoted more idealistic approaches 
which examine whether and how democracy could provide legitimacy beyond the state and argued 
for diverse forms of individual or collective participation of different constituencies. On the other 
hand, democratic contestations of the dominant normative model originated from within 
democracies emphasizing democratic self-determination over international legal obligations.52 The 
criticism went beyond the traditional opposition between international law and national 
sovereignty but led to contestations of the concept of ‘open statehood’ ‘when gained by a 
disenfranchisement of people and peoples.’53 Instead of requiring faith in experts, a process of 
politicization was called for.54 Thus, the idea that democratic states are open to and inevitably 
intertwined with global governance is increasingly contested.  
This is where populism steps in. Current emanations of populism are seen by many political 
observers as a response to the failure of mainstream politicians to ‘sell’ the benefits of global 
governance to their constituencies and to have often pursued a delegitimizing discourse implying 
that political decisions were forced upon them by international institutions. 55  From such a 
perspective populist governments may just articulate legitimate concerns of significant parts of 
populations around the globe. Still, there is also a perception that populists are ‘hijacking’ 
arguments of globalization critique because it provides them with some additional legitimacy.56 
                                                        
47 K. L. Scheppele, Worst Practices and the Transnational Legal Order (2016), 9; available at: 
https://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/events/wright-scheppele2016.pdf.  
48 Kumm, ‘Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law’ in S. Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas (2006), 256, at 273 et seqq. 
49 Amongst others: A. v. Bogdandy et al (eds), Offene Staatlichkeit (2008). 
50 Kumm, supra note 48, at 276 et seq. 
51 Koskenniemi, ‘What Use for Sovereignty Today?’, 1 Asian Journal of International Law (2011), 61, at 63 and 65. 
52 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 1 et seq. 
53 Weiler, supra note 12, at 562. 
54 Koskenniemi, supra note 51, at 67 et seq. 
55 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 117. 
56 Cf. Müller, supra note 21, at 56. 
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Due to the anti-elitist and anti-pluralist stance and the exclusionary form of identity politics, most 
observers question that populist globalization critique can be a corrective for international law in 
that it furthers legitimacy of global governance.57 It is more likely that their impact pushes towards 
a re-emphasing of more traditional elements of international law as they are embraced in the 
concept of a law of coordination. 
b) Promoting a Law of Coordination 
International law as a law of coordination is commonly described as a law which does not aim to 
construct an international community but merely aims to provide for a minimal order between 
independent states. These states do not accept any higher authority and refute any substantive 
common value system. In such an understanding, international law’s function is reduced to keeping 
states peacefully apart and to organizing ‘unilateral or common action where an issue cannot be 
managed effectively by each [state] alone’. Equally sovereign states are the relevant actors and 
where international organizations are created, they mainly serve their member states’ interests. 
Substantive rules focus on the protection of sovereignty, such as the principle of non-intervention, 
while law enforcement works on a bilateral basis and jurisdiction of international courts depends 
exclusively upon state consent. 58  Populist governments promote such an understanding of 
international law by opposing those elements of current international law which are built upon 
multilateral structures, international institutions and the concept of an international legal 
community based on common values. 
aa) Multilateralism  
In view of its anti-pluralist nature, populism is likely to refute multilateralism. Pluralism assumes 
that a society is composed of a large variety of different groups with different interests and 
acknowledges diversity within societies. It assumes that the political process of defining common 
goods must be based on negotiations and compromise because the political process needs to 
balance competing interests.59 International law reflects such pluralist structures. Multilateral fora 
offer a framework and a vocabulary through which highly differing actors can formulate their 
demands and claims, justifications and contestations for identifying common values and 
establishing institutions to implement them.60 The populist rejection of compromise pushes against 
the pluralist nature of multilateralism. In contrast, bilateral or unilateral structures seem to make it 
easier to realize what a populist leader conceives as the common good.  
The focus of the current US administration on bilateral and regional trade agreements61 bears 
witness to this tendency. In political speeches, Hungarian Prime Minister Orban supports a 
bilateralist vision of international law. In quoting President Trump’s phrase ‘it is the right of all 
nations to put their own interests first’, he approved that ‘the era of multilateralism is at an end, 
and the era of bilateral relations is upon us.’62 Accordingly, some populist governments have paid 
                                                        
57 Alston, supra note 4, at 4; Helfer, ‘Populism and International Human Rights Institutions’, iCourts Working 
Paper Series, No. 133 (2018), at 7 et seqq. 
58 Wolfrum, supra note 46, paras. 41-48. 
59 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 8. 
60 A. Hurrell, On Global Order (2007), at 312-313. 
61 US, The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda and 2016 Annual Report of the President of the United States 
on the Trade Agreements Program (March 2017), at 1 and 7. 
62 Hungary, Prime Minister Orban, Speech at the Lámfalussy Conference delivered on 23 January 2017. 
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much political attention to intensifying their bilateral relations with non-Western states, in the 
case of Hungary, for example, through concluding economy-related bilateral agreements with 
China, the Philippines and Vietnam.63 Bilateral trade relations may also serve as an instrument to 
forge alliances with like-minded states. In 2018, for example, Venezuela and Turkey concluded a 
bilateral trade agreement64 and Venezuela has reportedly moved its international gold reserves 
from Switzerland to Turkey65 in order to escape the consequences of an EU human-rights-related 
sanctions regime which Switzerland had supported.66 Even though the picture is blurred by the fact 
that a turn to bilateralism and mega-regional trade agreements has generally been observed in 
recent years67 populist governments apparently promote this trend. 
Moreover, the rejection of multilateralism does not seem to depend on its legal form. Where 
multilateral efforts contradict perceived national interests the lack of legally binding obligations 
does not seem to temper opposition. For instance, both the US68 as well as Hungary69 have 
announced that they will not join the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The 
Global Compact which sets standards for cooperation in world-wide migration explicitly states that 
it is non-legally binding which in turn means that it cannot be considered to be an international 
legal agreement but only that it creates compliance expectations in the political sphere.  
bb) International Institutions 
The anti-establishment stance of populism furthers scepticism towards international institutions 
which may be depicted as manifestations of ‘the global technocratic elite’. In its 2012 political 
programme, the Latvian National Alliance ‘All for Latvia!’ – ‘For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK’, for 
instance, advocated ‘a more aggressive policy in international organizations based on its national 
interests and existing legislation. The benefits of participating in specific international bodies, 
compared with the resources invested and eventual sovereignty constraints, should be seriously 
assessed’. 70  
While in its current programme a more moderate tone is chosen, the alliance still emphazises that 
‘the activities of Latvia's representatives in international organizations will be based on the long-
term defense of Latvia's national interests’.71 According to a 2017 Hague Centre for Strategic Studies 
                                                        
63 Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Press Statement, 13 May 2017; Hungary, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Press Statement, 27 March 2017; Hungary/Vietnam, Joint Press Statement, 10 September 
2018. 
64 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, Press Statement, 4 October 2018. 
65 Reuters, Venezuela says it is refining gold in Turkey following sanctions, 18 July 2018, available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-gold/venezuela-says-it-is-refining-gold-in-turkey-following-
sanctions-idUSL1N1UE1DV. 
66 Switzerland, Verordnung über Maßnahmen gegenüber Venezuela, SR 946.231.178.5, 28 March 2018. 
67 Altemöller, ‘Bilateralism and Unilateralism’, 13 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2018) 62. 
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survey of foreign policy goals in the political programme of populist parties in Europe and the US, 
an explicit national interest driven policy is common to all the parties.72  
A populist strategy to ‘hijack’ institutions which ‘produce the “morally wrong” outcome,’73 is not 
readily available in highly institutionalized or nearly universal international organizations. Thus, in 
order to make sure that the populist understanding of the one common good will be realized, 
withdrawal becomes a serious policy option. Populist governments have withdrawn or threatened 
to withdraw from a number of international treaties. For instance, Venezuela notified the 
denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights in 2012,74 the Philippines announced 
the withdrawal from the International Criminal Court in 2018,75 and UKIP was instrumental in the 
Brexit76. However, the overall number of withdrawals has remained low and the most striking cases 
concern the United States. 
While withdrawal may appeal to a particularly powerful state, such as the United States, other 
populist governments may prefer to remain within these institutions challenging or aiming to 
reform them from within. After all, membership in an international organisation also confers 
legitimacy and recognition globally. 77  For example, Hungary is a member of the ACT-Group 
advocating for a reform of the exercise of the veto power in the Security Council78 and the Latvian 
alliance ‘For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK’ supports UN Security Council reform calling for 
‘openness, accountability and transparency’. It criticizes the ‘abusive … exercise of the right of veto, 
bypassing the principles of the UN Charter’79 in line with what most human rights NGOs currently 
advocate. 
As a further strategy populist governments may try to create alternative institutions which they can 
dominate more easily than established ones or where they can forge alliances with like-minded 
states. An example can be seen in Venezuela’s efforts to establish the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR). UNASUR was intended as a replacement for Mercusor and the Andean 
Community. Behind the rhetoric of interstate cooperation and economic integration observers 
submit that the establishment of UNASUR is nonetheless meant to further national priorities.80 The 
Visegrad Group already formed in 1991 as a non institutionalized cooperation by the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia has currently assumed the role of a platform for 
countering EU migration policies.81 
Populist governments’ sceptical stance towards international organizations may significantly 
increase instances of non-compliance. If participation in international organisations is only 
acceptable for defending national interests, decisions of such institutions are likely to be 
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disregarded where they are seen to conflict with such interests. This may not only be an issue of 
factual non-compliance but can also entail more far-reaching consequences for legal structures. 
For example, in its party programme, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) puts Austria’s 
international legal obligations under an explicit national interest reservation: ‘Accepting and 
fulfilling international obligations may not be to the detriment of the Austrian population.’82 In a 
populist ductus, the programme acknowledges the prevalence of the interest of the Austrian 
population not the prevalence of the state interest. Such an approach would entail the 
consequence that in cases where compliance with international law is detrimental to such 
interests, international law would be dispensed with at the national level. This would affect 
interpretative principles, such as the doctrine of Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit, which requires the 
judge to apply an interpretation which allows to bring national law in line with the international 
legal obligations of the state. 
According to the 2017 survey of the Hague Institute for Strategic Studies 10 of 18 analysed parties 
‘state that national law has priority over international law and reject the jurisdiction of 
international courts’.83 In view of the dualist doctrine on the relationship between international 
and national law this is a very broad and unspecified observation. Still, the most obvious conflict 
between populist stances and predominant interpretations of international law unfolds in the 
relationship with international (human rights) courts,84 not least because of populist policies to 
alter the composition and structure of national constitutional courts and to limit civil rights. The 
concept of a constitutional or national identity has gained increasing relevance as an instrument to 
formulate opposition against international or supranational court decisions. While the concept has 
been applied by Constitutional Courts throughout Europe in the wake of the 2009 Lisbon judgment 
of the German Constitutional Court85 and in the light of Art. 4 (2) TEU, its recent invocation in a 
number of judgments has raised concerns of abusive practices among academic observers. The 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, for instance, used the concept of national identity in a 2016 
judgment in order to uphold the government’s rejection of the EU’s refugee relocation scheme.86 
Literature has criticised the judgment for abusing the concept as ‘a justification for nationalistic 
political purposes’. 87  Another pertinent example concerns the Russian Constitutional Court. 
According to the 2015 amendments to the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court, the Court 
is competent to declare decisions of international courts as ‘unenforceable’ if they are 
incompatible with the ‘fundamentals of the Russian constitutional system’ and the ‘human rights 
regime established by the Constitution’. As a consequence ‘no actions/acts whatsoever’ may be 
taken in order to implement the decision of an international court, in particular the European 
Court of Human Rights. Since this ‘prevents the execution of [a] decision in any manner whatsoever 
in the Russian Federation’, the Venice Commission, in an Opinion of 2016, has observed that ‘the 
law is incompatible with the obligations of the Russian Federation under international law’.88 The 
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Constitutional Court of Venezuela even advised its government to withdraw from the American 
Convention on Human Rights. In a 2008 judgment the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had 
found that Venezuela had breached the American Convention on Human Rights by expelling three 
judges and ordered their reinstatement. As a response the Supreme Court held that the Inter-
American Court had overstepped its competences, that the judgment could therefore not be 
executed and urged the government to withdraw from the American Convention. 89  In these 
decisions, populist identity politics have already altered legal arguments on how to reconcile 
tensions between international and national law. 
Beyond the strict legal realm, populist governments sometimes react to international institutions 
which criticize their policies by what may be called discursive attacks. A case in point is the dispute 
between the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights and the Hungarian government in 2018. In his 
opening speech to the 37th Session of the UN Human Rights Council the Commissioner referred to 
the Hungarian Prime Minister by stating that ‘xenophobes and racists in Europe are casting off any 
sense of embarrassment – like Hungary's Viktor Orban...“.90 In response, the Hungarian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs called for the resignation of the Commissioner since he ‘has behaved in a manner 
that is unworthy of his position, because “an international official with an excellent salary that is 
paid for by contributions from member states” cannot speak in this way, and cannot declare war on 
a democratically elected Prime Minister…. He noted that he felt it was pathetic and “unmanly” of 
the High Commissioner to have left the Human Rights Council chamber after reading his statement 
on Tuesday.’91  
cc) An International Community Structured around Common Interests 
Based on their holistic identity politics, populist stances are likely to produce tensions with 
concepts of universalism and common interests of an international community based on 
international solidarity. A populist approach is more likely to favour particularized, culturally-
contingent value concepts contradicting the idea that a national identity could be formed around 
‘a commitment to a global community structured around universal values’.92 For preserving their 
identity policies populist governments will often rely on more traditional elements of international 
law. Their understanding promotes those international norms which protect state sovereignty and 
the domaine réservé– ‘the us’.  
Former National Security Advisor to President Trump, H.R. McMaster, together with the former 
Director of the National Economic Council, Gary Cohen, formulated the most outspoken opposition 
to the idea of an international community pursuing common interest: ‘the world is not a “global 
community” but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and 
compete for advantage’.93  
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Both speeches President Trump delivered before the UN General Assembly in 201794 and 201895 
respectively demonstrate that the current US administrations draws a picture of the international 
legal order which resembles a law of coordination rather than a law of cooperation.96 A populist 
ductus shines through the 2017 speech. The word ‘people’ is used 50 times often combined with 
emotionally enriched adjectives, such as ‘decent people’, ‘good people of Iran’, ‘innocent people’, 
or ‘powerful people’. Thereby, the speech reflects the populist ‘moralistic imagination of politics … 
that sets a morally pure and fully unified people … against’ the establishment.97 The speech directly 
refers to the populist idea of liberating the victimized people: 
For too long, the American people were told that mammoth multinational trade deals, 
unaccountable international tribunals, and powerful global bureaucracies were the best way 
to promote their success. But as those promises flowed…others gamed the system and broke 
the rules. And our great middle class, once the bedrock of American prosperity, was 
forgotten and left behind…98 
From a populist reading of the US political system President Trump then deduces his 
understanding of his foreign policy doctrine ‘America first’: 
The greatest part of the United States Constitution is its first three beautiful words. They are: 
“We the people.”... In America, the people govern, the people rule, and the people are 
sovereign… 
In foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our government's 
first duty is to its people, to our citizens - to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to 
preserve their rights, and to defend their values.  
As President of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders 
of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first.... As long as I hold 
this office, I will defend America’s interests above all else.99 
His speech is a clear affirmation of a national interest driven foreign policy. It focuses on 
separation, autonomy of political communities and ‘closed statehood’ – a perspective which he 
underlines with an explicit reference to the Monroe Doctrine in his 2018 speech.  
US President Trump turns the triad of rule of law, democracy and human rights, which has become 
a marker for the progress of international law in the 1990s, into a triad of sovereignty, security and 
prosperity. While the speech refers 22 times to sovereignty it only explicitly mentions the notion 
‘human rights’ once. Trump draws a picture of the global order focussed on ‘independent nations’. 
While he sees room for international cooperation ‘rooted in shared goals, interests, and values’, he 
explicitly claims that ‘the nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating human condition’. As a 
consequence, the whole speech ignores concepts of international solidarity in line with the anti-
pluralist stance of populism. If populist policy is pursued ‘for the sake of a moral, hardworking “us” 
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and not for the immoral… “them”,100 solidarity elements of international law need to be rejected. If 
from a populist perspective ‘there is only one common good and one way to represent it’, any 
diverging community interest and any deliberative process to define it seems flawed. Thus, when 
referring to World War II as the momentum leading to the establishment of United Nations, 
President Trump stresses the parallel national interests of the participating nations, not the 
common cause of world peace uniting them. This may be read as an expression of scepticism 
towards any idea of common interests of an ‘international community’ – a word which is not used 
once. President Trump’s speech draws a picture of the international legal order reminiscent of the 
founding period of the UN to which the speech frequently refers. Moreover, President Trump 
explicitly refutes elements of global governance as well as the idea of any power-limiting role of 
international law. This approach becomes even more outspoken in his 2018 speech when he 
denounces the ICC and continues to state: 
We will never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable global 
bureaucracy. America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and we 
embrace the doctrine of patriotism. Around the world, responsible nations must defend 
against threats to sovereignty not just from global governance, but also from new forms of 
coercion and domination. 
The picture of an international legal order which emerges from both speeches reduces its function 
to coordinating parallel or conflicting interests. States seem to be free to respond unilaterally to 
disruptions of that order: While rights of states to defend their national interests are emphazised, 
corresponding duties towards other states are scarcely mentioned.  
However, practice suggests that it would be too far-fetched to assume that populist governments 
reject all concepts of common interests. Mirroring its engagement with the ACT-Group Hungary is 
member of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and supports R2P-related 
initiatives at the UN.101 Poland, for instance, demonstrate a comparable attitude.102 Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela, in contrast, are opposed to the concept of R2P considering it to be an instrument of 
or pretext for illegitimate intervention.103 Thus, a coherent picture is difficult to draw because of 
ideological, geographical and historical contingencies. 
The populist focus on sovereignty based on holistic identity politics also fosters what observers 
have called ‘respatialising power’104 and thus reinforces the image of ‘closed’ statehood. The 
protection of states’ borders through legal and physical control becomes a visible symbol for 
sovereignty-based identity politics which explains the prominent role that migration policies play 
for populist governments in their criticism of global governance.105 While it is empirically difficult to 
pin down to what extent populist governments have directly influenced European immigration 
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policies, diverging indirect effects are acknowledged in political science literature.106 There are 
indications that populist migration discourses have contributed to a securitization of immigration 
also affecting the broader legal framework. A case in point is the legal regime for search and 
rescue at sea. Comparing practices in the EU and Australia, literature has observed ‘a shift in State 
practice in the interpretation and application of [pertinent] international norms’ in the Law of the 
Sea towards securitization, militarization and criminalization endangering the formerly 
predominant humanitarian objectives of the regime.107  
However, populist identity politics also transgress the border paradigm. Where international 
human rights obligations align with their identity politics governments may promote these rules. 
For instance, within the United Nations, Hungary and Poland actively support efforts for the 
protection of religious and ethnic minorities, in particular Christian minorities in North Africa and 
the Levante.108 Moreover, in view of national minorities outside its territory, Hungary also promotes 
European minority protection regimes.109 But the impact remains ambiguous. The initiative of the 
Austrian government to offer dual citizenship to members of the German-speaking minority in 
Southern Tyrol has initiated a political dispute between Italy and Austria in 2018.110 
c) Changing Trends by Changing Perceptions 
From a legal positivist perspective, a significant part of current challenges for international law 
appears to be confined to the level of rhetoric. Neither political speeches nor party programmes 
directly translate into legally relevant acts challenging international law. Politics of withdrawal are 
in line with consent-based international law and an important incentive for states to accept 
binding treaty rules in the first place. Moreover, withdrawal of a state party can be preferable to 
non-compliance since constant and symbolic non-compliance might also weaken the legitimacy of 
an institution. In principle, a threat of withdrawal can be an instrument to overcome a standstill 
within international organisations and to push for law-reform. Still, in a recent article, James 
Crawford, warned against ‘the increasing rhetoric of scepticism against international law’ because 
it ‘may precipitate a larger-scale retreat into nativism and unilateralism’.111 Indeed, international 
lawyers should be aware that the political discourse and the political environment which surround 
international law are highly relevant for its overall development because they may influence 
perceptions of its state. 
Even withdrawals which are in line with international law contribute to such a change of 
perception. For decades a withdrawal from major multilateral treaties seemed a taboo with very 
few exceptions. Recent practices have affected this perception and have thus opened space to quit 
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multilateral agreements which in turn makes the international order appear more fluid and 
reversible. Simultaneously, practices of withdrawal invoke the historic example of the League of 
Nations. The decline of the League was partly attributed to the high number of withdrawals. 
Altogether 17 states withdrew from the League during its existence. A comparison of the current 
development with 1930s looms in the background.  
Populist strategies to withdraw from treaties or to create alternative institutions also affect the 
authority of existing institutions. These practices may increase scepticism as to whether an 
institution is apt to fulfil its objectives, they increase possibilities for forum-shopping to reach 
politically desired outcomes, and they may ultimately render international institutions 
dysfunctional. 112  Discursive attacks on international institutions may also undermine their 
authority.113 Populism is sometimes associated with a certain form of communication strategy 
which strives to receive public attention by breaking certain conventions. There is tendency to use 
‘provocative statements and violent attacks on opponents’.114 One may doubt that such forms of 
provocation are confined to populist strategies. The 1960 shoe-banging incident in the UN General 
Assembly may be quoted as a famous counter-example. Soviet statesman, Khrushchev, had 
allegedly hit a shoe on his desk in response to the criticism of the human rights situation in 
Eastern Europe. Anyway, where international institutions criticize human rights violations they 
must be prepared for robust debates. It may raise the legitimacy of international organizations 
when disputes leave the realm of legal and diplomatic conversation and open up to broader more 
robust political discourses. Still, where negative public discourses are shaped by populists’ 
antagonistic stances and their tendency to delegitimize opponents, they entail a danger of 
escalation. Again, historical reminiscence of the 1930s suggests that delegitimizing international 
institutions may just be a prequel to an even more serious crisis. 
Eventually, the broader political context contributes to the perception of a crisis. Many of the 
states with populist governments emerged from authoritarian regimes after the end of the Cold 
War and first embraced democratic constitutionalism and an understanding of open statehood. 
Hungary is the first state whose status has been reduced by Freedom House from a ‘consolidated 
democracy to a ‘semi-consolidated’ one.115 Since they are seen as ‘backsliders’ to the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights protection at the national level,116 populist governments contribute to 
an overall perception of decline of the 1990s narrative. With fostering an understanding of 
international law as a law of coordination they reinforce this impression. Moreover, populist 
governments are not the only actors who are contesting the 1990s narrative of international law. 
Their contestations and rejections are reinforced by the agenda of autocratic regimes. The most 
prominent example may be seen in the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of International Law, 
issued by the Russia and China on 25 June 2016. The Declaration which, inter alia, highlights the 
sovereign equality of all states, the principle of non-intervention, and state consent as the basis of 
                                                        
112 Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, ‘Backlash against international courts’, 14 International Journal of Law in 
Context (2018), 197, at 200, 209 and 211. 
113 Ibid., at 212. 
114 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 16, at 4; cf. Manucci, ‘Populism and the Media’ in C. Rovira 
Kaltwasser et al (eds), supra note 3, at 471. 
115 Scheppele, supra note 34, at 574 note 103; Freedom House, Nations in Transit (2015), available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf. 
116 Scheppele, supra note 47, at 8. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339338 




international law may also be seen as a claim to understand international law as a law of 
coordination. 
General perceptions about the state of the legal order and its political environment presumably 
have a greater impact on the development of international law than of national law. Given that 
there is no centralised legislator and only a rudimentarily centralised judiciary, customary 
international law and interpretations of treaty law emerge in a partly empirical process and 
depend on normative evaluations by numerous different actors with diverging competences, such 
as states, courts or academics. Thus, a normative evaluation of a certain practice will often only be 
qualified as a trend. The identification of trends and the direction they take as well as the claim as 
to which trend will prevail, will be influenced by the perception of the overall context and political 
discourse. 117  An impression of backsliding may exert a chilling effect on such interpretative 
processes. Thus, changes in the political environment and discourse may affect international law in 
that they set the frame against which lawyers formulate their assumptions about the development 
of the international legal order and the interpretation of its rules. 
d) Changing International Rules by Changing National Legislation 
Populist governments also push for changes of the interpretation of specific international legal 
rules, in particular by changing pertinent national legislation.  An important example concerns 
legislation regulating foreign funding for NGOs. Admittedly, populist governments are not alone in 
imposing legal restrictions on foreign funding. Not only authoritarian states, such as China,118 but 
also liberal democracies, such as Australia,119 enact pertinent legislation. However, this observation 
makes the case of foreign funding regulation a particularly fitting one since it is characteristic for 
populist governments that their governmental strategies move in grey areas. Their criticism may 
address a valid point, but the objectives pursued, as well as the manner in which change is brought 
about, remain ambiguous both in terms of legitimacy and legality. In particular, the manner in 
which foreign funding for NGOs is regulated by certain states illustrates the specific populist 
impact on international law. Populist governments have been at the forefront of the pertinent 
developments and have apparently influenced each other, as well as other states. The example 
demonstrates their role in contesting settled standards to give room for processes of norm change.  
aa) Transnational NGOs between Global Public Opinion and the Principle of Non-
Intervention 
Those academic voices which have advocated for introducing elements of democracy into global 
governance rely on NGOs as representatives of global public opinion. German political thinkers, 
such as Jürgen Habermas and Hauke Brunkhorst120  have emphasized the creation of ‘global 
democracy backed by a global civil society’.121 They discerned a global public in the making122 based 
                                                        
117 Cf. Krieger and Nolte, supra note 13, at 5 et seq. 
118 China, Order No. 44 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, effective on 1 January 2017. 
119 Australia, Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Bill 2017. 
120 E.g. Habermas and Derrida, ‘Nach dem Krieg’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31.05.2003, at 33 et seq; 
Brunkhorst, ‘Globalising Democracy Without a State’ 31 Journal of International Studies (2002), 675, at 680 et 
seq. 
121 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Klabbers et al. (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009), 263, 
at 314. 
122 Brunkhorst, supra note 120, at 689. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339338 




on transnational media of communication and transnational networks of NGOs. NGOs were seen as 
increasingly deterritorialized actors spreading human rights norms, rule of law and democracy.123 At 
the level of the UN, this perception was reflected in the 2004 Cardoso Report which advocated 
participatory democracy globally:  
Public opinion has become a key factor influencing intergovernmental and governmental 
policies and actions. The involvement of a diverse range of actors, including those from civil 
society and the private sector, …, is not only essential for effective action on global priorities 
but is also a protection against further erosion of multilateralism.124 
Such an understanding of the legitimizing effect of civil society at the global level calls for a 
democratic rule of law-based public sphere at the national level composed of political parties, 
NGOs and other social movements as well as free media and established constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of opinion, assembly and association.125 To achieve these preconditions after the end of 
the Cold War transnational political influences were exerted openly through publicly funded 
agencies and NGOs.126 As a consequence, the principle of non-intervention lost relevance. Indeed, 
since the principle of non-intervention addresses states, private foreign funding would not fall 
under the prohibition while indirect government funding raises opaque questions of attribution. 
With the end of the Cold War the principle of non-intervention also lost much of its normative grip. 
It served a central purpose in a bipolar international order based on sharp ideological 
controversies between two models of how government should be organized.127 In such a context, 
the prohibition of non-intervention could be used as a tool to obstruct opposing ideological 
influences and thus be seen to contribute to minimizing tensions between the two blocks. With the 
‘end of ideological confrontation’ in 1990 not only increasing processes of globalization128 but also 
the impression that only one normative model for organising state power remained made non-
intervention look out-dated.129 
Populist governments re-inforce the claim to non-interference. On the bases of their antagonistic 
anti-establishment stance and their holistic identity politics populist governments share the goal 
of restricting NGO activity as well as the tendency to resist the spread of global norms through civil 
society.130 ‘For them, opposition from within civil society creates a particular moral and symbolic 
problem: it potentially undermines their claim to exclusive moral representation of the people’.131 
Thus, they apply argumentative strategies to demonstrate that the civil society in their state is not 
representing the view of ‘the people’ but is influenced or even controlled by external powers. With 
this policy they aim to make their holistic vision of ‘the people’ a reality 132  and describe 
transnational NGOs as foreign agents. The antagonistic rhetoric exerts symbolic effects in order to 
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denounce any legitimacy of global public opinion or transnational participatory democracy. 
Therefore, populist governments foster the re-emergence of non-intervention discourses and 
promote a re-emphasis of a broader understanding of states’ domaine réservé aiming, inter alia, to 
restrict foreign funding for NGOs. 
bb) Re-emergence of Non-intervention Discourses 
Of course, a more frequent use of the principle of non-intervention in political statements does not 
necessarily lead to changes in the interpretation of customary international law. The difficulty to 
‘distinguish cases where the language of ‘non-intervention’ is used as political rhetoric from those 
where it is used to make a legal argument’ has been a long-standing challenge for legal 
interpretations.133 Where statements are, however, accompanied by pertinent legislation the scope 
and content of a rule might change.  
(1) Restricting Foreign Funding for NGOs 
The development to enact stricter regulations against NGOs is seen to have started already in the 
early 2000s as ‘backlash against democracy promotion’ in China and Russia.134 While the Venice 
Commission holds that most of the Member states of the Council of Europe do not regulate foreign 
funding for NGOs,135 an empirical study in 2013 examined 98 countries world-wide and claimed that 
39 restrict such funding while 12 even prohibit it.136 Most of the restrictions are apparently directed 
against human rights NGOs.137 Russia, Hungary, and Venezuela are among the front-runners of these 
developments.  
Venezuela enacted a Law on Defence of Political Sovereignty and National Self-Determination in 
2010, which entirely forbids political parties and NGOs involved in political or human rights matters 
to, inter alia, receive foreign funding.138 According to Art. 1 it applies to ‘groups that promote, 
defend, spread, or inform citizens ... about the full exercise of their political rights.’139 Earlier 
Russian and Chinese legislation is said to have influenced the enactment of the pertinent law.140 
In 2012, the Russian Federation enacted a ‘Law on Foreign Agents of the Russian Federation.’141 The 
Law creates the legal status of a ‘foreign agent’ for NGOs receiving funding from abroad and 
participating in political activities. The Law stipulates an obligation to register which is 
accompanied by a sanctioning system. Such organisations are required to display the label ‘foreign 
agent’ on every publication they make available. As justification President Putin uses a populist 
argumentative strategy: ‘No one has the right to speak for all of Russian society, especially those 
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who are directed and financed from abroad and thus serve the interests of others(...).’142 Russian 
representatives are quoted to have advanced the principle of non-interference as a justification for 
the regulation.143  
Probably influenced by the Russian example, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a Law on the 
Transparency of Organisations Receiving Support from Abroad in June 2017.144 The Law establishes 
an obligation to register for associations and foundations which obtain more than 7.2 million 
forints (around 24.000 Euro) foreign funding. In addition, it creates reporting and disclosure 
obligations, above all the obligation to put the label ‘civic organisation funded from abroad’ on 
publications. While the Hungarian legislator does not apply the term ‘foreign agent’ in the law, in 
the debates accompanying the legislative process Hungarian politicians used the term frequently. 
The Venice Commission was explicitly concerned about the effect of such a usage on the Hungarian 
society and doubted that within this context the term ‘organisations receiving support from 
abroad’ would be a neutral one.145  
(2) Foreign Funding as Political Interference in the Domaine Réservé? 
Such an interconnected change of practice as in the cases of Venezuela, Russia and Hungary may 
contribute to an interpretation of what constitutes a political interference in the domaine réservé 
and thus a violation of the principle of non-intervention. Despite its central position in traditional 
international law the exact contours of the principle of non-intervention have remained fluid. The 
interrelatedness between the domaine réservé and a state’s constantly evolving human rights 
obligations prompts an interpretation according to which states can rely on their margin of 
appreciation available under human rights law in order to delineate their domaine réservé and to 
define what constitutes an illegal interference.146 Thus, in principle, any legislation complying with 
a state’s human rights obligations can define a state’s domaine réservé. Political interference is a 
broad concept encompassing miscellaneous situations where one state influences the internal 
political processes of another. Pertinent activities may differ considerably in terms of intensity and 
coerciveness.147 They include forms of indirect interference, inter alia through political subversive 
means. On this basis the concept of political interference is usually delineated according to 
different categories of cases.148 
There is so far no established international jurisprudence on restrictions of foreign funding for 
NGOs. Cases against the Russian legislation are pending before the European Court of Human 
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Rights (ECHR)149 but general standards may provide some orientation. According to the Nicaragua 
judgment funding for violent insurrectionary opposition groups constitutes an illegal 
interference.150 In the case of non-insurrectionary political parties, state practice has not been very 
clear but has apparently evolved since the 1980s. 151  In 2007, the ECHR confirmed that the 
prohibition on the funding of political parties by foreign states and foreign political parties is 
‘necessary for the preservation of national sovereignty’ and thus compatible with Article 11 of the 
Convention.152  
In case of NGO funding the Council of Europe (CoE) has issued a number of recommendations and 
advocates different standards than for political parties. Thus, CoE Recommendation 
CM/REC(2007)14 states that  
50. …NGOs should be free to solicit and receive funding … not only from public bodies in 
their own state but also from institutional or individual donors, another state or multilateral 
agencies, subject only to the laws generally applicable to customs, foreign exchange and 
money laundering and those on the funding of elections and political parties.  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation adds that ‘such donations should not be 
subject to … to any special reporting obligation.’153 This interpretation is currently challenged by 
those states which claim that their human rights’ margin of appreciation covers a right to enact 
legislation limiting foreign funding for NGOs based on different justificatory strategies. The success 
of their attempts depends on the resilience of international structures in maintaining formerly 
consented interpretations.  
cc) The Challenge for International Institutions: Identifying Evasive Legal 
Arguments 
Many observers consider Hungary to be a prime example for populist strategies to broadly act 
within the framework of a constitutional democracy and its international obligations yet to alter 
the defining features of democratic constitutionalism that embraces ‘open statehood’.154 Such a 
strategy challenges the lawyer’s ability to identify where populist governments raise valid legal 
arguments in order to promote law-reform or where they employ ‘evasive legal tricks’.155  Thus, the 
official justification for the Hungarian Law - in line with the standards set by the CoE’s resolutions - 
invokes the need to protect the political and economic interests of the country and to counter 
money-laundering and financing of terrorism by furthering transparency. Moreover, after criticism 
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by the CoE156 the Hungarian Parliament adopted the Law responding to some of the issues raised. 
The Venice Commission accepted that these amendments improved the law but considered the 
amendment to be insufficient to meet Hungary’s human rights obligations.157 Of course, there is per 
se nothing specific about violating human rights by legislation which imposes disproportionate 
sanctions or exerts discriminatory effects. Such human rights violations may occur in any 
constitutional democracy and can be rectified in judicial processes. Hungary responded to the 
criticism of the Venice Commission by accepting certain international criticism but demonstrated 
that the government continues to consider its claim to regulating foreign-funding of NGOs as 
politically legitimate as well as legally realizable.  
As a consequence, the Hungarian Law poses a specific challenge for human rights institutions 
because, first, the aim to guarantee transparency in order to stop money-laundering or financing of 
terrorism complies prima facie with the CoE standards. Secondly, the assumption that transparency 
is only desirable to stop criminal activities is in itself increasingly contested because transparency 
about foreign funding is considered to be a guarantee for political accountability. Accordingly, one 
can observe considerable changes in the reasoning of the Venice Commission when comparing its 
approaches in the cases of Russia in 2014 and Hungary in 2017. While the Venice Commission’s 
statements on the Russian law applied the standards of CoE Recommendation CM/REC(2007)14,158 it 
now accepts that ‘the aim of ensuring transparency of civil society organisations in order to 
prevent undue foreign political influence’ may be legitimate.159 
Thus, international institutions controlling legislative acts of populist governments need to take 
into account that claims raised by these governments may have a legitimate core and address 
issues where law-reform is required as a corrective for negative and unintended consequences of 
globalization. Otherwise the identification of ‘evasive legal arguments’ may become a slippery 
slope when rejecting contestations of dominant legal interpretations. Human rights institutions 
have to carefully scrape out where a per se legitimate aim is only used as a pretext. In order to 
question that a law’s purpose is legitimate they have to take into account the overall context and, 
in particular, the circumstances under which the law was drafted. Delineating whether such a law 
crosses the tipping point and can be considered to be legally evasive poses an argumentative 
burden. To meet this burden, human rights institutions can rely on those elements of human rights 
protection which allow to take the overall context into account. They include the prohibition of 
unjustified discrimination or the criterion of creating a ‘chilling effect’ through a regulation on the 
freedom of speech. The Venice Commission relies on both elements in the cases of Russia and 
Hungary.160 
But what maybe more difficult to claim is that a per se legitimate aim is affected by political 
debates within a state that have a strong populist undertone. Where the limit of criminal law is not 
crossed it is difficult to take a particular political environment into account. Of course, the ECHR 
might question whether a certain legitimate aim is truly pursued.161 Examples concern cases where 
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court proceedings were inconclusive because contradictory legal evidence in procedure existed162 
or where the interference could not attain the goal pursued and would thus not serve the 
legitimate aim pursued. 163 A per se legitimate aim may also be falsely claimed where the factual 
basis for an executive or legislative measure is obviously insufficient. But the Court has so far been 
hesitant to deduce from the conduct of the parliamentary proceedings or the public debate 
surrounding a legislative process that a legitimate aim was falsely advanced. Thus, in the case of 
S.A.S. v. France on the prohibition of the burkha in public places in France the Court was only ‘very 
concerned by ... certain Islamophobic remarks [which] marked the debate which preceded the 
adoption of the Law.’164 But the court did not question the legitimate purpose of the law on these 
grounds. In the long run the structural specifics of human rights may lead to the question to what 
extent the individual rights-based approach of international human rights adjudication is apt to 
respond to challenges posed by populist governments because the broader context, such as other 
legislative or constitutional changes, cannot sufficiently be included in the review of a specific 
human rights violation. As a consequence, these limitations may make monitoring and reporting 
procedure more important in the years to come. 
4. Conclusion: Between Principled Opposition and Cherry-picking 
Populist governments’ attitude towards international law oscillates between an instrumental 
approach and a rhetoric-based principled opposition which, if enacted in practice, would 
significantly change international law’s nature as it has developed after 1990. Populist governments 
promote a concept of international law as a law of coordination and aim to reduce international 
law to an instrument for furthering national interests. This approach also impacts upon the 
interpretation of the relationship between international and national law: the latter should prevail 
where international law is seen to be detrimental to the interests of the population. So far, such 
very fundamental rifts between international law and the defining characteristic of populism 
predominantly materialize in political speeches and party programmes. Withdrawal or non-
participation gain high attention among international audiences but still remain the exception. 
Most efforts to influence the development of international law or to escape its restrictions remain 
within the legal limits imposed by international law although some instances of non-compliance, in 
particular in the field of human rights protection, have exerted a strong symbolic impact. Beyond 
rhetoric and symbolism the instrumental approach of populist governments fosters cherry-picking 
according to their policy preferences which may be influenced by ideological approaches as well as 
historical or geographical contingencies. There are also indications that populist governments 
occasionally ally in order to circumvent existing structures, to promote their agenda within 
international organizations or to change predominant interpretations of international law.  
All this contributes to a perception of populist governments as backsliders in relation to the move 
which international law made after the end of the Cold War and furthers the impression that 
international law is currently in a state of crisis. One may be tempted to interpret this development 
as a temporal occurrence which will eventually not affect the overall (progressive) development of 
international law. One may even hail such turbulences as a way to bring about long-awaited 
reforms of the international legal order which may not be so progressive, after all. Or one can 
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simply ask whether the 1990s end of ideological confrontation lead international lawyers to 
overestimate the move international law had made and assume that ‘the end of ideologies’ is now 
substituted by ‘the end of illusions’. But all these considerations cannot hide that populist 
governments present a very fundamental challenge to international law and its institutions and 
require the international lawyer to reflect what needs to be preserved and what should be altered 
in the years to come. 
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of international law in a changing global order. Can we, under the current significantly changing 
conditions, still observe an increasing juridification of international relations based on a 
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